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Defending Israelis or Suppressing Palestinian
Self-Determination? An Analysis of Operation
Protective Edge Using the Two-Factor Test 
Wajiha Rais*
On July 7, 2014, Israel launched its third military offensive in Gaza in 
six years, dubbed Operation Protective Edge.1 The Operation lasted for fifty 
days before Israel and Hamas agreed to an Egyptian brokered cease-fire on 
August 26, 2014.2 According to the United Nations, 2,131 Palestinians were 
killed during the offensive, of whom 1,473 were civilians.3 On the Israeli 
side, seventy-one people died, of whom four were civilians.4
Israel justified the offensive as an act of self-defense against 
indiscriminate rocket attacks5 and the so-called “terror tunnels.”6 The 
“terror tunnels” were a network of underground tunnels that went from 
Gaza to Israeli territory.7 In an interview with Fox News, Israeli Prime 
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, reiterated that “Israel . . . is defending its 
people as any country would under similar circumstances.”8 On its official 
blog, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) stated that a goal of Operation 
Protective Edge is to “stop Hamas’ incessant rocket attacks against Israel’s 
*  J.D. Candidate 2016, Florida International University College of Law. I would like to 
acknowledge Professors Noah Weisbord and Charles Jalloh for providing insight and advice that 
assisted my research and writing.
1 Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza, IDF BLOG, www.idfblog.com/facts-figures/rocket-attacks-
toward-israel (last visited Mar. 13, 2015) [hereinafter Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza].
2  William Booth & Ruth Eglash, Israel, Hamas Reach Cease-Fire Deal Brokered by Egypt,
WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2014), www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/israel-hamas-reach-cease-
fire-deal-brokered-by-egypt/2014/08/26/cc834c02-2d49-11e4-bb9b-997ae96fad33_story.html.
3 Gaza Emergency Situation Report (as of 4 September 2014, 08:00 hrs), UNITED NATIONS
OFFICE FOR THE COORDINATION OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS, OCCUPIED PALESTINIAN TERRITORY 1 
(Sept. 4, 2014), www.ochaopt.org/documents/ocha_opt_sitrep_04_09_2014.pdf. 
4 Id. at 2. 
5 Netanyahu: Some in West Say They Support Israel’s Right to Defend Itself as Long as We 
“Don’t Exercise That Right”, CBS DC (July 22, 2014), washington.cbslocal.com/2014/07/22/
netanyahu-some-in-west-say-they-support-israels-right-to-defend-itself-as-long-as-we-dont-exercise-
that-right [hereinafter CBS DC].
6 The IDF’s Mission in Gaza: Destroy Hamas Terror Tunnels, IDF BLOG (July 17, 2014), 
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/17/idf-begins-ground-operation-gaza.
7  These tunnels, built by Hamas, reach up to thirty meters below the ground. In 2006, the tunnels 
were used to capture Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit. Timeline 1,940 Days from Gilad Shalit’s Abduction to 
His Release, HAARETZ (Oct. 11, 2011), www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/timeline-1-940-
days-from-gilad-shalit-s-abduction-to-his-release-1.389452.
8 CBS DC, supra note 5.
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civilians”9 while Netanyahu said that the Operation will continue until the 
tunnels are destroyed.10 The message behind the statements is clear—Israel 
is defending itself against Palestinian rockets and tunnels. United States 
President, Barack Obama, echoed this message when throughout the 
Operation, he reaffirmed Israel’s “right to defend itself.”11
Not everyone agrees with the characterization of Israel’s actions as 
self-defense. During the Operation, John Dugard wrote an op-ed titled, 
“Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument,” in which he argued that 
Israel’s offensive “must [not] be seen as an act of self-defense by a state 
subjected to acts of aggression by a foreign state or non-state actor. Instead, 
it should be seen as the action of an occupying power aimed at maintaining 
its occupation.”12 He reiterated this argument the following week in an 
interview with Amy Goodman on an episode of DEMOCRACY NOW!13 The 
Russell Tribunal on Palestine14 similarly found that “people living under 
colonial rule or foreign occupation are entitled to resist occupation” and that 
“Israel’s actions are those of an occupying power using force to maintain its 
occupation and to suppress resistance, rather than a state resorting to force 
in lawful self-defense.”15
How Israel’s actions are characterized carries legal significance. The 
use of force in self-defense is an “inherent right” of States under Article 51 
9 Rocket Attacks on Israel from Gaza, supra note 1. 
10 Steve K. Walz, Netanyahu: Gaza Operation Will Continue Until Terror Tunnels Are 
Neutralized, JEWISH PRESS (July 30, 2014), www.jewishpress.com/special-features/israel-at-war-
operation-protective-edge/netanyahu-gaza-operation-will-continue-until-terror-tunnels-are-neutralized/
2014/07/30.
11 See Joseph Lederman, Obama: “Israel Has the Right to Defend Itself”, HUFFINGTON POST
(July 14, 2014, 8:18 PM), www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/07/15/obama-israel-ceasefire_n_
5586229.html; Obama: Israel Has Right to Defend Itself, PRESS TV (July 27, 2014, 10:32 PM), 
www.presstv.com/detail/2014/07/27/373040/obama-israel-has-right-to-defend-itself.
12  John Dugard, Debunking Israel’s Self-Defense Argument, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (July 31, 
2014, 6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/7/gaza-israel-internationalpoliticsunicc.
html.
13 Can Israel Claim Self-Defense Against the Territory It Occupies? Int’l Jurist John Dugard 
Says No, DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 6, 2014), www.democracynow.org/2014/8/6/can_israel_claim_self_
defense_against.
14  “The Russell Tribunal has no legal status but acts as a court of the people, a Tribunal of 
conscience, faced with injustices and violations of international law, that are not dealt with by existing 
international jurisdictions, or that are recognised but continue with complete impunity due to the lack of 
political will of the international community. . . . [The Tribunal] is composed of eminent people from all 
states . . . . [Its legitimacy] does not come from a government or any political party but from the 
prestige, professional interests and commitment to fundamental rights of the Members that constitute 
[the] Tribunal.” About, RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON PALESTINE, www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/
about-rtop (last visited Apr. 9, 2015). 
15 Russell Tribunal on Palestine Emergency Session on Gaza 30, RUSSELL TRIBUNAL ON 
PALESTINE (Sept. 24, 2014), www.russelltribunalonpalestine.com/en/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/TRP-
Concl.-Gaza-EN.pdf.
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of the U.N. Charter and one of only two exceptions to the Charter’s ban on 
the use of force under Article 2(4).16 Furthermore, the International Court of 
Justice (ICJ) confirmed that Israel has both the right and a duty to protect its 
inhabitants.17 The use of force for the purpose of suppressing a people’s 
struggle for self-determination, on the other hand, is prohibited under 
international law.18 While the former purpose behind the use of force is 
legal, the latter is illegal. The question, which follows, is how does one 
determine whether force was employed for the legitimate purpose of 
protecting citizens or for the illegal purpose of suppressing a people’s 
struggle for self-determination? Neither the State of Israel nor Dugard 
explain how they arrived at their respective characterizations of Operation 
Protective Edge. In fact, existing international law does not provide us with 
any test, guideline, or legal framework to make this difficult determination. 
The law, as it currently exists, is inapt at dealing with the interplay of force 
and self-determination as it takes place in the Israel-Palestine conflict. This 
Comment proposes a two-factor test to fill this gap in the law. 
This Comment is divided into seven sections. The first provides a brief 
background of the law on self-determination, including the right to use 
force by national liberation movements and occupying powers. The 
following three sections demonstrate the inaptness of existing law, in the 
context of the Israel-Palestine conflict, to provide an answer to the question 
of when force by an occupying power is for the legitimate purpose of 
protecting its inhabitants and when it is for the illegitimate purpose of 
suppressing self-determination. The second section argues that jus in bello,
or international humanitarian law (IHL), is unsuited to answer the question 
at issue because it only regulates how war is conducted and is unconcerned 
with the reasons for the use of force. This section further argues that 
occupation law, in general, is wholly unsuited to the Palestinian situation 
because it was created to regulate European occupations, which unlike 
Palestine did not involve liberation struggles. The third section explains that 
in light of the ICJ’s Wall advisory opinion, the law of self-defense too is 
unsuited to the Israel-Palestine situation. The fourth section concludes that 
the doctrine of necessity, codified in the Articles on Responsibility of States 
for Internationally Wrongful Acts,19 does not help either since it presumes a 
16  The other exception is the use of force by authorization of the U.N. Security Council under 
Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter. 
17  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 141 (July 9) [hereinafter Wall opinion]. 
18  HEATHER A. WILSON, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY NATIONAL
LIBERATION MOVEMENTS 135–36 (1988). 
19 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with 
Commentaries, [2001] Y.B. Int’l L. Comm’n 31, art. 25, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 [hereinafter Draft Articles 
on Responsibility of States].
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 132 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 132 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 8:21 PM
258 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:255 
wrongful act, which leads us back to the question of whether the use of 
force was in fact wrong (i.e., whether it was used to suppress self-
determination). To answer the question at issue, the fifth section proposes 
the following two-factor test: (1) was force necessary to combat the threat 
to the occupier’s inhabitants; and (2) did force go beyond that which was 
necessary to combat the threat? The sixth section applies this test to the 
threat of tunnels in Operation Protective Edge in order to determine whether 
Israel used force in pursuit of a legitimate security operation or if its aim 
was to suppress the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination. The 
seventh section concludes with a summary of the argument. 
SECTION I: SELF-DETERMINATION AND THE RIGHT TO USE FORCE BY 
NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS AND OCCUPYING POWERS
The Right to Self-Determination 
The concept of national self-determination has its historical roots in 
the concept of popular sovereignty proclaimed by the French Revolution.20
Self-determination, at the time of the French Revolution, meant self-
government; a government should reflect the will of the demos. Because 
self-determination posed a threat to the established order, for a long time it 
was considered a political issue and was not accorded a legal status.21
However, the concept made a popular return after the First World War.22
The pressures of decolonization accelerated the acceptance of self-
determination as a legal right.23 Today, it is “difficult to deny the right of 
self-determination a true legal status.”24 Although it had contentious 
beginnings, the principle of self-determination is now “firmly established in 
international law.”25 The ICJ, in its 2004 advisory opinion, reaffirmed the 
principle of self-determination and reiterated its status as a right erga
omnes—meaning it is a concern of all States.26
Interestingly, no explicit mention of self-determination appears in the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.27 The concept was only “indirectly 
20  A. RIGO SUREDA, THE EVOLUTION OF THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION 17 (1973). 
21 Id. at 25-6; JAMES CRAWFORD, THE CREATION OF STATES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 108 (2d 
ed. 2006) (“Self-determination as a legal right or principle threatened to bring about significant changes 
in the political geography of the world, not limited to the dismemberment of Empires. . . . [I]t was 
potentially a most significant exception to the traditional view that the creation of States is a matter of 
fact and not of law.”). 
22  SUREDA, supra note 20, at 20. 
23 Id. at 27. 
24 Id.; CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 122, 127. 
25  CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 122. 
26 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 88, 118. 
27  League of Nations Covenant. 
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recognized as applicable to the territories placed under mandate.”28 These 
were territories which, after the First World War, were no longer under the 
sovereignty of States that previously governed them and its people were not 
yet considered capable of self-government.29
The U.N. Charter, on the other hand, does include the word, “self-
determination,” in Article 1(2) and in the preamble of Article 55.30 The 
Charter states that the purpose of the United Nations (U.N.) is “[t]o develop 
friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate 
measures to strengthen universal peace.”31 The International Covenant on 
Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) also reaffirm the right of 
all peoples to self-determination.32
Despite the official recognition of the right to self-determination in the 
U.N. Charter, it was unclear for some time who the subjects of self-
determination were.33 In other words, exactly who or which “peoples” had 
the right to self-determination? Sir Ivor Jennings eloquently stated the 
following: 
Nearly forty years ago a Professor of Political Science who was also 
President of the United States, President Wilson, enunciated a doctrine 
which was ridiculous, but which was widely accepted as a sensible 
proposition, the doctrine of self-determination. On the surface it 
seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous 
because the people cannot decide until somebody decides who the 
people are.34
Debates in the Coordination Committee during the drafting of the U.N. 
Charter reveal problems relating to the meaning of the word “peoples.”35
There were disagreements among States on the use of the word “peoples” 
and what this meant vis-à-vis the terms “nation” and “state.”36 In response 
to the confusion, the Secretariat clarified in a memorandum that “peoples” 
28  SUREDA, supra note 20, at 96 (quotations omitted); 2 DAVID HUNTER MILLER, THE DRAFTING
OF THE COVENANT 12–13 (1928). 
29  League of Nations Covenant art. 22; SUREDA, supra note 20, at 97. 
30  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2, & art. 55. 
31  U.N. Charter art. 1, ¶ 2. 
32  International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, S. Treaty 
Doc. No. 95-19, 6 I.L.M. 360, art. 1 (1967); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 
16, 1966, S. Treaty Doc. No. 95-20, 6 I.L.M. 368, art. 1 (1967). 
33  SUREDA, supra note 20, at 28; see CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 125. 
34  SIR IVOR W. JENNINGS, THE APPROACH TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 55–56 (1956). 
35  SUREDA, supra note 20, at 99. 
36 Id. at 99–100. 
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refers to “group of human beings who may, or may not, comprise states or 
nations.”37 Self-determination covers a group of peoples, nations, and 
States.38 Thus, the U.N. Charter not only recognized a peoples’ right to self-
determination, but it also gave the word “peoples” the broadest possible 
meaning.39
With regard to the Palestinians, specifically, the ICJ noted in its 
advisory opinion in 2004 that Palestinians are indeed “peoples” with a right 
to self-determination.40 In fact, it stated, “[T]he existence of a ‘Palestinian 
people’ is no longer in issue.”41 The Court elaborated that the existence of a 
Palestinian people has been recognized even by Israel, whether in the 
exchange of letters between Yasser Arafat42 and Yitzhak Rabin43 or in the 
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip.44
The Use of Force by National Liberation Movements 
Interestingly, however, while a people have a right to self-
determination, it does not automatically follow that they may use force in 
pursuit thereof.45 Despite the universal recognition and acceptance of a 
peoples’ right to self-determination, consensus is lacking on whether force 
can be used in pursuit of that right.46
Historically, the right to use force was not extended to national 
liberation movements.47 This is because, traditionally, the right was 
understood to belong only to States and not to “peoples.”48 However, as 
more and more colonies started to gain independence following the Second 
World War, the notion that national liberation movements have a right to 
use force in pursuit of self-determination began to gain support.49 The 
rationale behind the shift was that “[i]f the continuance of colonial 
domination is contrary to the right of self-determination . . . then the use of 
force to secure that right should not be condemned.”50
37 Id. at 100. 
38 Id.
39 Id. at 101. 
40 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 118. 
41 Id.
42  Former President of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO). 
43  Former Prime Minister of Israel. 
44 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 118. 
45  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94. 
46 Id. at 135–36. 
47 See id. at 91, 95. 
48 Id.
49 Id. at 93–94. 
50 See HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94. 
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 134 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 134 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 8:21 PM
2015] Analysis of Operation Protective Edge 261 
Support for the right of liberation movements to use force in pursuit of 
self-determination seems to be divided along political lines.51 The right “is 
actively supported by the newly independent States and the Eastern Bloc 
States, but has never been accepted by an established government 
confronting a liberation movement, or by the Western States.”52 The 
division and associated politics are pronounced in the several United 
Nations General Assembly (UNGA) resolutions passed on the subject. 
During the 1960s, an era of wide decolonization, the UNGA passed several 
resolutions recognizing the legitimacy of liberation movements’ struggle to 
achieve self-determination.53 Due to disagreements between States, 
however, the resolutions avoided unequivocal language expressly 
condoning the right to use force as part of the struggle, so as to achieve a 
wide consensus among States.54
The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples, passed in 1960, was the first major resolution on 
decolonization.55 While it recognized the right of colonial people to struggle 
for independence, the resolution made no mention of an armed struggle.56
Then in 1965, the UNGA passed Resolution 2105 (XX) in response to 
Portuguese, South African and Rhodesian intransigence.57 The Resolution 
“recognize[d] the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial 
rule to exercise their right to self-determination.”58 While many States 
interpreted “struggle” to mean armed struggle, the colonial powers and the 
U.S. resisted this interpretation.59 This ambiguous word formed the standard 
language in subsequent resolutions on the subject throughout the 1960s.60
Some UNGA resolutions on Portuguese colonies and Namibia 
affirmed the legitimacy of the people to struggle for independence “by all 
means at their disposal.”61 While a step forward, the resolutions once again 
fell short of unequivocally condoning the right to use force. The ambiguity 
51 Id. at 136. 
52 Id.
53 Id. at 96. 
54 Id.
55 G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/1514 (Dec. 14, 1960); CHRISTINE GRAY,
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE 60 (3d ed. 2008). 
56  GRAY, supra note 55; HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94. 
57  G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2105 (Dec. 20, 1965); HEATHER WILSON, supra note 
18, at 95. 
58  G.A. Res. 2105 (XX), ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2105 (Dec. 20, 1965) (emphasis added). 
59  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94; see GRAY, supra note 55. 
60  GRAY, supra note 55. 
61  G.A. Res. 2708 (XXV), ¶ 5, U.N. Doc. A/RES/2708 (Dec. 14, 1970); G.A. Res. 2652, ¶ 1, 
U.N. Doc. A/RES/2652 (Dec. 3, 1970); G.A. Res. 3295 (XXIX), ¶ 3, U.N. Doc. A/RES/3295 (Dec. 13, 
1974); GRAY, supra note 55, at 62. 
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was deliberate so consensus among States could be achieved.62
In 1970, the UNGA passed by acclamation the Declaration on 
Principles of International Law, according to which, 
every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which 
deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present 
principle of their right to self-determination. . . . In their actions 
against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise 
of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek 
and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles 
of the Charter.63
Some took the above language, which was arguably stronger than that of 
previous UNGA resolutions, as confirmation of the right to use force by 
liberation movements.64 Others like Heather Wilson, however, argue that 
the language continues to be ambiguous and the resolution was passed 
unanimously precisely because “its more controversial provisions could be 
interpreted in a variety of ways.”65 Despite the ambiguity, however, the 
debates on the resolutions reveal that most States understood the language 
to allow for armed struggle.66
The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) too passed several 
resolutions using the same ambiguous terms.67 In 1966, for example, the 
UNSC passed a resolution recognizing the legitimacy of the “struggle” of 
the people of Southern Rhodesia.68 Just like the language in the UNGA 
resolutions, it was unclear whether “struggle” meant armed or simply 
peaceful struggle. 
Conversely, resolutions that expressly recognized the right to use force 
were met with resistance from colonial powers and other Western States.69
Meanwhile, developing countries were adopting resolutions in international 
conferences explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of the right to use force in 
pursuit of self-determination.70 The ambiguous language of UNGA and 
UNSC resolutions, combined with significant support from Afro-Asian 
countries, but a lack of support from colonial and Western powers for 
62  GRAY, supra note 55, at 62.
63  G.A. Res. 2625 (XXV), U.N. Doc. A/RES/2625 (Oct. 24, 1970); HEATHER WILSON, supra
note 18, at 98. 
64  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 99. 
65 Id.
66 Id.
67  GRAY, supra note 55, at 62. 
68  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 96; S.C. Res. 232, ¶ 4 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
69  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 96; see, e.g., G.A. Res. 3070 (XXVIII), at 78 (Nov. 30, 
1973); G.A. Res. 39/72 (Dec. 13, 1984). 
70  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 94–95. 
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stronger language, reveals an obvious divide based on political and power 
interests.
Even if some States did not explicitly accept the authority of liberation 
movements to use force as a matter of law, their actions indicated 
acquiescence in some circumstances.71 Although some States did not openly 
condone the use of force by liberation movements, “they had at least begun 
to condemn the use of force by the colonial power, but not the liberation 
movement.”72 For example, since the 1967 war in which Israel occupied 
territories belonging to its neighbors (and at least until 1973), there was a 
trend in UNSC resolutions to condemn Israeli use of force against “terrorist 
activities” coming from Jordan and Lebanon but to not similarly condemn 
Arab guerilla activity as illegal.73
The fact that the Security Council has never expressly condemned the 
guerilla activities of the Palestinians [emanating from Jordan and 
Lebanon] can be interpreted as an implied recognition of their right to 
recover at least the territories from which they were displaced in the 
June 1967 hostilities, and to do so by the use of force.74
In summary, a consensus is lacking on the right of liberation 
movements to use force for self-determination with colonial powers and 
other Western States generally opposing such a right while the developing 
world supporting it. Nevertheless, “the trend . . . since 1960 in particular 
has been toward the extension of the authority to use force to national 
liberation movements.”75 Meanwhile, according to James Crawford—judge 
at the ICJ—a non-State entity’s right to use force for self-determination is 
“legally neutral” in the sense that it is “not regulated by international law at 
all.”76 Therefore, while it cannot unequivocally be said that Palestinians 
have the right to use force against Israel in their struggle for self-
determination, nor can it unequivocally be said that they do not have such a 
right. While the law lacks a clear allowance for the use force by 
Palestinians, it also lacks a clear prohibition against their use of force. 
The Use of Force by an Occupying Power 
While the law is unclear on whether national liberation movements 
may use force in pursuit of their right to self-determination, it is very clear 
in prohibiting an occupying power from using force to suppress the 
71 Id. at 103. 
72 Id. at 111. 
73  SUREDA, supra note 20, at 343. 
74 Id. at 343–44. 
75  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 136. 
76  CRAWFORD, supra note 21, at 135–36. 
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people’s struggle for self-determination.77 “[T]he use of force to deny the 
free exercise of a people’s right to self-determination is contrary to the 
principles of international law.”78 All occupations or administrations of 
territory by foreign powers are supposed to be temporary. Even though 
international law recognizes the state of occupation, such a state has always 
been understood as a temporary condition. A belligerent occupier is 
obligated to withdraw from occupied territories upon the cessation of 
hostilities.79 Because belligerent occupation is a consequence of war, “it is 
not political in its effects.”80 Therefore, sovereignty is not transferred to the 
occupying power.81 Prolonged belligerent occupations in effect become 
annexations, in violation of international law. 
An occupying power is not prohibited from using force under all
circumstances. Rather, because an occupying power has the obligation to 
ensure public order and safety, it may use police force to that end.82 An 
occupier also “has the right, and indeed the duty to respond, in order to 
protect the life of its citizens.”83 Therefore, an occupying power may use 
force for certain purposes, but must never use force to suppress a people’s 
struggle for self-determination. In fact, because self-determination is a right 
erga omnes,84 and has the status of a pre-emptory norm,85 all States are 
prohibited from suppressing this right whether by forceful or non-forceful 
means. 
In summary, unlike the ambiguous nature of the law on the right of 
national liberation movements to use force, the law very clearly prohibits an 
occupying power from employing force to suppress self-determination. 
Meanwhile, an occupying power can use force for certain other purposes 
including protecting its population from attacks.86 Hence, while Israel may 
use force to protect its civilians from Palestinian attacks, it cannot use force 
to suppress the Palestinians’ struggle for self-determination. The question 
that follows is, how does one know whether Israel is using force to protect 
its civilians or to suppress Palestinian self-determination? The following 
77 Id. at 135–37, 147. 
78  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 135. 
79 Occupation and International Humanitarian Law: Questions and Answers, ICRC (Aug. 4, 
2008), www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/misc/634kfc.htm.
80  GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON, HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 38 (1st ed. 1910). 
81 Id.
82  Tristan Ferraro (ed.), Occupation and Other Forms of Administration of Foreign Territory,
ICRC (Mar. 2012), www.icrc.org/eng/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-4094.pdf; Hague Regulations, 
art. 43. 
83 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141. 
84 Id. ¶¶ 88, 118. 
85 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, at art. 26 comm. (5). 
86 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141. 
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 136 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 136 Side A      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 8:21 PM
2015] Analysis of Operation Protective Edge 265 
three sections explore existing bodies of law (i.e., jus in bello or occupation 
law, law of self-defense and the doctrine of necessity) in search of an 
answer to this question. Because existing law does not provide any relevant 
guidance, Section V of the Comment proposes some factors to help answer 
the question. 
SECTION II: JUS IN BELLO AND THE LAW OF OCCUPATION
This section looks at the jus in bello legal regime and the law of 
occupation. It explores the two in search of guidance to help answer the 
question that is at issue in this Comment. This section finds that the jus in 
bello legal regime offers no relevant guidance since it only governs how 
force is used once an armed conflict begins, and is unconcerned with the 
motives behind the use of force. The central question of this Comment, 
however, is concerned with only the motives of the State of Israel behind its 
use of force, and whether those motives are the protection of its civilians or 
the suppression of Palestinian self-determination. This section also finds 
that the law of occupation, in general, is inapt at dealing with the question 
at hand because occupation law developed outside the context of colonial 
occupations.87 It was historically meant only to regulate European 
occupations, which were not colonial occupations, and, therefore, 
occupation law does not take into account issues of self-determination.88
Jus in Bello 
Jus in bello is the legal regime which regulates the conduct of war.89 It 
is also referred to as international humanitarian law (IHL), the bulk of 
which is codified in The Hague Regulations, the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, and Additional Protocols I and II. The treaties, which form the 
core of IHL, are considered customary international law. This means that 
the treaties are binding on States even if they are not a party to them. The 
jus in bello legal regime is triggered once an armed conflict begins.90 The 
ICJ confirmed in its 2004 advisory opinion that international humanitarian 
law is applicable to the Occupied Palestinian Territory.91
87  Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation: Critical Examinations of the 
Historical Development of the Law of Occupation, 94 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 51, 72 (2012) 
[hereinafter Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation].
88 Id.
89  KEIICHIRO OKIMOTO, THE DISTINCTION AND RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN JUS AD BELLUM AND 
JUS IN BELLO 8 (2011). 
90   Robert Kolb, Origin of the Twin Terms Jus ad Bellum/Jus in Bello, ICRC RESOURCE CTR.,
(Oct. 31, 1997), www.icrc.org/eng/resources/documents/article/other/57jnuu.htm.
91 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 101. 
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While the jus in bello legal regime is applicable to the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory,92 it is irrelevant to the question at issue in this 
Comment because jus in bello is not a legal basis for the legitimate use of 
force. It merely regulates how war is waged and is unconcerned with the 
reasons for waging war, let alone whether those reasons are legitimate or 
illegitimate. Such concerns fall under the domain of jus ad bellum instead. 
In fact, jus in bello rules of warfare apply to all parties to the conflict 
regardless of the legitimacy of their use of force or their status as victim or 
aggressor.93 In other words, just because a State waged an illegal war 
against another State, this does not mean that the victim State is not bound 
by jus in bello in its use of force against the aggressor State. The underlying 
interest, which jus in bello seeks to safeguard, is the protection of 
civilians.94 The equal applicability of jus in bello to both victim and 
aggressor ensures that civilians of the aggressor State are protected just like 
civilians of the victim State.95
Additionally, all parties to an armed conflict are bound to respect jus in 
bello rules of war regardless of the legality of their initial resort to force. 
This helps ensure that the aggressor State cannot flout its jus in bello
obligations just because its initial resort to force was unlawful. If all 
military actions of a State, who unlawfully resorted to force, were 
considered illegal by virtue of the illegality of its initial resort to force, then 
the aggressor State would lack any incentive to restrict its military conduct 
according to IHL. 
It is impossible to demand that an adversary respect the laws and 
customs of war while at the same time declaring that every one of its acts 
will be treated as a war crime because of the mere fact that the act was 
carried out in the context of a war of aggression.96
The otherwise lawful method of warfare by an aggressor State does not 
become unlawful merely because it violated jus ad bellum.97
Jus in bello is unconcerned with the reasons for using force but only 
with regulating conduct of hostilities once an armed conflict has begun. It 
is, therefore, irrelevant to the question whether an occupying power used 
force to protect its civilians or to suppress self-determination. The 
occupying power can abide by IHL but still employ force for the 
illegitimate purpose of suppressing a people’s struggle for self-
92 Id.
93  OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 14–24; Francois Bugnion, Just Wars, Wars of Aggression and 
International Humanitarian Law, 84 INT’L REV. OF THE RED CROSS 523, 533–36 (2002). 
94  OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 11. 
95 Id. at 15. 
96  Bugnion, supra note 93, at 541. 
97  OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 29. 
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determination. Its compliance (or non-compliance) with IHL says nothing 
about its motives for resorting to force. At most, it may be argued that a 
gross violation of jus in bello principles of military necessity and 
proportionality may indicate a motive that is other than the protection of 
civilians. Generally, however, jus in bello is irrelevant for purposes of the 
question that this Comment poses. 
The Law of Occupation 
One would assume that the most obvious law to consult for limits on 
the use of force by an occupying power is the law of occupation.98
However, even the law of occupation, in general, is not applicable to the 
central question of this Comment as it relates to the Israel-Palestine 
conflict. This is because the Israel-Palestine conflict is a “situation . . . in 
which belligerent occupation and wars of national liberation overlap.”99 The 
law of occupation, on the other hand, was created to regulate European 
occupations, which unlike the occupation of Palestine, did not involve 
liberation struggles.100 Because existing occupation law developed outside 
the context of colonial occupations involving liberation struggles, it does 
not take into account the right of self-determination.101 It is, therefore, inapt 
to deal with issues of force in the context of self-determination, which do 
exist in the Israel-Palestine conflict. 
Ideas of liberalism and freedom from monarchical rule laid the 
foundation for the development of the law of occupation.102 Such ideas 
swept across Western Europe from the end of the eighteenth century to the 
middle of the nineteenth century, challenging the monarchical political 
order of the continent.103 Revolutionaries waged wars in other countries in 
order to oust the ruling monarchy and liberate the oppressed local 
98 See generally YUTAKA ARAI-TAKAHASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW AND THE INTERACTION WITH INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS LAW (2009) [hereinafter ARAI-TAKASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION].
99  HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 20; see also Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 78, 118 
(finding that Palestinian territory east of the Green line is occupied by Israel and that Palestinians are a 
“people” who have the right to self-determination). 
100 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 72; Martti Koskenniemi, 
Occupied Zone—”A Zone of Reasonableness”?, 41 ISR. L REV. 13, 30 (2008). 
101 See Matthew Saul, Research Fellow at the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights and Lecturer 
at Durham University, U.K.,  Symposium on the Functional Approach to the Occupation of the Gaza 
Strip and the Right to Self-Determination (Apr. 25, 2012), http://opiniojuris.org/2012/04/25/the-func
tional-approach-to-the-occupation-of-the-gaza-strip-and-the-right-to-self-determination (stating, “both 
Hague Law and Geneva Law were created before the emergence of the legal right to self-
determination”) 
102  Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 55. 
103 Id.
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population.104 Since the revolutionaries waged war not to annex territory but 
to liberate the local population, the revolutionaries’ interests were aligned 
with those of the locals.105 Thus, the occupying revolutionaries did not face 
resistance from the occupied population and there was no tension between 
the two.106 Occupation was meant to be temporary and, therefore, did not 
lead to liberation struggles. The law of occupation developed in this context 
as a way of managing the new European territorial order.107
After the French Revolution, occupation became distinct from 
conquest.108 In fact, the 1791 French Constitution stated, “[T]he French 
nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view of making 
conquests, and it will never use its forces against the liberty of any 
people.”109 Territory was no longer seen as belonging to the king, but rather 
as belonging to the people.110 Thus, ousting of the sovereign did not transfer 
sovereignty to the occupying power.111 This new conceptualization of 
sovereignty forms the basis of the “conservationist principle”112 in the 
Fourth Geneva Convention whereby the occupying power is simply a 
custodian of the occupied territory who must preserve the status quo and 
does not have the sovereign authority to change existing laws.113 The 
occupying power merely fills a “temporary vacuum created by the ousting 
of the local government and maintain[s] its bases of power until the 
conditions for the latter’s return are mutually agreed upon.”114 Thus, 
occupation law developed, as a theory distinct from conquest, to manage 
the newly emerging European political and territorial order. 
It is not as if European powers at the time were not engaged in 
occupations for the purpose of annexing territory in which they faced 
resistance from liberation movements. In fact, the period of the collapse of 
the European monarchical political order was also the height of imperialism 
and colonialism.115 However, these “occupations [of non-European 
territories] that led to colonial control were placed outside the constraints of 
104 Id.
105  Koskenniemi, supra note 100, at 30. 
106 Id.
107  Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87; Koskenniemi, supra note 100. 
108  EYAL BENVENISTI, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF OCCUPATION 25 (2d ed. 2012). 
109  FRENCH CONSTITUTION OF 1791; Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 
87, at 55. 
110  Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 55. 
111  Koskenniemi, supra note 100, at 26. 
112  Gregory H. Fox, The Occupation of Iraq, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 195, 199 (2005). 
113  Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 43, 
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Fourth Geneva Convention]. 
114 BENVENISTI, supra note 108, at 69. 
115 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 74. 
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the law of occupation.”116 Since sovereignty was a “gift of civilization,” the 
law of occupation, which preserved the sovereignty of the occupied people, 
was applied only to “civilized” European nations and not to “uncivilized” 
non-European nations.117 Hence, the law of occupation was never 
developed to deal with colonial occupations involving liberation 
movements. In fact, the legal right of self-determination emerged after the 
creation of occupation law.118 In fact, until the period of decolonization in 
the mid-twentieth century, the law of occupation was considered a largely 
European project.119 It is, therefore, unsuited to the Israeli occupation of 
Palestinian Territory, which is both a belligerent occupation and a struggle 
for national liberation.120
The Law of Occupation, for example, permits the occupying power to 
require the occupied people to swear an oath of obedience (albeit not 
allegiance) whereby the occupied must behave in a peaceful manner, not 
take part in hostilities and obey the occupying power.121 Furthermore, 
occupied inhabitants who sabotage military institutions of the occupying 
power may be punished by death.122 The foundation of belligerent 
occupation, writes Yoram Dinstein, is the “power of the bayonet.”123 This 
stands in stark contrast to the law of self-determination, which bans the use 
of force to suppress a people’s struggle for self-determination. The contrast, 
which is due to the fact that the law of occupation developed separately 
from and before the legal right to self-determination124 shows that 
occupation law is ill-suited to colonial occupations involving national 
liberation struggles.125 Its rules on the use of force cannot be appropriately 
applied to the Israeli occupation of Palestine as they were never meant to 
regulate such an occupation. We, therefore, cannot look towards the law of 
occupation for an answer to the question, when use of force by an 
occupying power is for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing self-
determination. 
116 Id. at 53. 
117 Id. at 74. 
118  Saul, supra note 101. 
119  Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87, at 72. 
120 See HEATHER WILSON, supra note 18, at 20. 
121  ARAI-TAKASHI, THE LAW OF OCCUPATION, supra note 98, at 44; UNITED STATES DEP’T OF 
THE ARMY, THE LAW OF LAND WARFARE: FIELD MANUAL 27–10, ¶ 432 (1956). 
122  Fourth Geneva Convention, supra note 113, art. 68. 
123  YORAM DINSTEIN, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION ¶ 80 (2009). 
124  Saul, supra note 101. 
125 Arai-Takahashi, Preoccupied with Occupation, supra note 87. 
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SECTION III: THE LAW OF SELF-DEFENSE
If not the law of occupation, perhaps the law of self-defense can help 
shed some light on the issue of when force used by an occupying power is 
legitimate and when it is for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing self-
determination. The law of self-defense seems to be the obvious legal regime 
to consult given that self-defense is the justification that Israel presents for 
Operation Protective Edge—not surprisingly since other than U.N. Security 
Council authorization, it is the only legally valid reason for States to use 
force. This section finds, however, that the law of self-defense is 
inapplicable to the Israel-Palestine conflict because Article 51 traditionally 
does not encompass armed attacks by non-state actors, Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 only refer to international terrorism, and the 
self-defense argument causes an impermissible confusion between the jus
ad bellum and the jus in bello. It, therefore, cannot be relied upon to answer 
the question that is at issue in this comment. 
The International Court of Justice’s (ICJ) advisory opinion on the
Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory provides valuable insight into the applicability (or 
lack thereof) of the law of self-defense to Israeli measures taken in response 
to terror attacks emanating from Palestinian territory.126 The Court 
addressed the following question in its opinion: 
What are the legal consequences arising from the construction of the 
wall being built by Israel, the occupying Power, in the Occupied 
Palestinian Territory, including in and around East Jerusalem, as 
described in the report of the Secretary-General, considering the rules 
and principles of international law, including the Fourth Geneva 
Convention of 1949, and relevant Security Council and General 
Assembly resolutions?127
Even though the construction of the wall was a non-forceful measure 
as opposed to the forceful measures used in Gaza, the opinion is still 
relevant to Operation Protective Edge. If the law of self-defense is 
inapplicable to Israel’s non-forceful responses to terror attacks, then it is 
certainly inapplicable to its forceful measures. 
Israel justified its construction of the wall, which as planned 
incorporated about sixteen percent of the West Bank between the wall and 
the Green Line,128 as an act of self-defense against terror attacks emanating 
126 See Wall opinion, supra note 17. 
127 Id. ¶ 141. 
128 Id. ¶ 122. 
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from the West Bank.129 It relied on Article 51 of the U.N. Charter, which 
affirms States’ inherent right to defend themselves from armed attacks.130
The ICJ, however, found that Article 51 had “no relevance in this case” 
because the attacks are not “imputable to a foreign State,”131 suggesting that 
Article 51 self-defense can only be invoked against an attack by a State.
The Court has been criticized for failing to explain how it arrived at 
this conclusion given that the language of Article 51 itself has no 
requirements relating to the legal personality of the attacker.132 An 
explanation is unnecessary because the Court’s interpretation of Article 51 
is not novel but has been the generally accepted interpretation for over fifty 
years.133 Indeed, before the attacks on the World Trade Center, one would 
not have imagined that non-state actors could be capable of employing the 
kind of force that has traditionally only been within the purview of States. 
However, global reality today is different and it is long recognized that 
“any interpretation of the U.N. Charter should allow for the evolution of the 
Organization [the U.N.] in accord with a changing global setting, especially 
in the area of international peace and security.”134 Today’s international 
community does not hesitate to acknowledge the right of States to defend 
themselves against armed attacks from non-state actors. The day after the 
terror attacks on the World Trade Center and the failed attack on the 
Pentagon, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1368, 
which reaffirmed in the context of the attacks “the inherent right of 
individual and collective self-defense in accordance with the Charter.”135
The same month, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 
1373, which also reaffirmed the inherent right to self-defense in the context 
of acts of terrorism.136 This resolution was passed under Chapter VII of the 
U.N. Charter and is binding upon all U.N. member States. Therefore, at 
least since 2001, “state practice appears to support the permissibility of 
responding in self-defense to an attack by a non-state actor.”137
129 Id. ¶ 116. 
130 Id. ¶ 138. 
131 Id. ¶139. 
132  Sean Murphy, Self-Defense and the Israeli Wall Advisory Opinion: An Ipse Dixit from the 
ICJ?, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 62, 63 (2005). 
133  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the West Bank, Advisory Opinion, 
2004 I.C.J. 136, ¶ 141 (July 9) (separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans) [hereinafter Wall separate opinion 
of Judge Kooijmans]. 
134  Richard Falk, Toward Authoritativeness: The ICJ Ruling on Israel’s Security Wall, 99 AM. J.
INT’L L. 42, 51 (2005). 
135  S.C. Res. 1368, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1368 (Sept. 12, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Resolution 1368]. 
136  S.C. Res. 1373, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1373 (Sept. 28, 2001) [hereinafter S.C. Resolution 1373]. 
137  Murphy, supra note 132, at 63. 
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Contrary to several critics of the ICJ’s Wall opinion, despite adopting a 
traditional interpretation of Article 51, the Court did not dismiss the right of 
a State to defend itself against armed attacks by non-state actors.138 In fact, 
the Court explicitly considered Israel’s self-defense argument under U.N. 
Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373.139 However, it rejected this 
argument because the attacks at issue emanated from within, not outside, 
territory that Israel controls.140 Several critics are baffled by the Court’s 
distinction,141 but a closer reading of the Court’s opinion and Judge 
Kooijmans’ separate opinion142 reveals that the distinction is well-founded. 
The language of Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, on which 
Israel relied, refers to “international terrorism” which affects “international 
peace and security.”143 Insofar as terror attacks emanate from within 
territory occupied and controlled by Israel, “[t]he situation is . . . different 
from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions.”144 Consequently, 
the Court found that Israel could not invoke self-defense under these 
resolutions either. 
There is yet another reason, not discussed by the Court in its opinion, 
for why Article 51 self-defense is inapplicable to Israel. In its oral statement 
to the ICJ, Palestine argued that invoking self-defense as justification for 
construction of the Wall causes “an impermissible confusion” between the 
jus in bello and the jus ad bellum, that “have to be kept radically apart.”145
Palestine elaborated this point in its written statement: 
The Fourth Geneva Convention permits forcible measures against 
civilian populations, subject to strict limits. That exhausts the legal 
rights of an Occupying Power. A State may not use all of its powers 
under the Fourth Geneva Convention and the Laws of War and then 
decide that those powers are inadequate and invoke the more general 
right of self-defense, which belongs to the jus ad bellum, in order to 
avoid the constraints of international humanitarian law.146
138 See, e.g., id.; Emanuel Gross, Combating Terrorism: Does Self-Defense Include the Security 
Barrier? The Answer Depends on Who You Ask, 38 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 569 (2005); Ruth Wedgewood, 
The ICJ Advisory Opinion on the Israeli Security Fence and the Limits of Self-Defense, 99 AM. J. INT’L
L. 52 (2005). 
139 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 138–39.
140 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶139. 
141 See, e.g., Wedgewood, supra note 138; Murphy, supra note 132. 
142 Wall separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans, supra note 133, ¶ 36. 
143  S.C. Resolution 1373, supra note 136. 
144 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139; Iain Scobbie, Words My Mother Never Taught Me “In 
Defense of the International Court”, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 82 (2005). 
145  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
2004 I.C.J. Pleadings 1, at 44–45 (Feb. 23, 2004). 
146  Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
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Self-defense is a part of the jus ad bellum, which allows for wider scope of 
action than military necessity under jus in bello.147 By relying on jus ad 
bellum self-defense instead of military necessity in jus in bello,148 Israel is 
trying to “set aside IHL obligations” and “take a wider military action.”149
Once an armed conflict has begun, the time to invoke self-defense has 
passed as the State has already resorted to force.150 Invoking self-defense as 
justification for Israeli measures against terror attacks is a misuse of the two 
abovementioned legal regimes. 
The law of self-defense is inapplicable to the Israel-Palestine conflict 
because Article 51 traditionally does not encompass armed attacks by non-
state actors. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373 only refer to 
international terrorism, and the self-defense argument causes an 
impermissible confusion between the jus ad bellum and the jus in bello. The 
law of self-defense, therefore, cannot be relied upon to answer the question 
that is at issue in this comment. 
On an important side note, just because Israel cannot rely on Article 51 
self-defense does not mean that it cannot take defensive measures at all. 
Emanuel Gross frustratingly writes, “[T]he central question—which the ICJ 
failed to recognize—was whether Israel had the right to defend itself 
against terrorist attacks.”151 What Gross fails to realize is that the Court 
unequivocally acknowledged that Israel “has the right, and indeed the duty, 
to respond [to terror attacks] in order to protect the life of its citizens.”152
The Court merely found that such a right cannot be based on Article 51 of 
the U.N. Charter. 
The right to take defensive measures in response to threats does not 
entail that these must qualify or should be justified as measures taken 
in self-defense under Article 51 of the Charter. To equate the two is 
simply to confuse the legal with the linguistic denotation of the term 
“defense.” Just as “negligence,” in law, does not mean “carelessness” 
but, rather, refers to an elaborate doctrinal structure, so “self-defense” 
refers to a complex doctrine that has a much more restricted scope than 
ordinary notions of “defense.”153
Written Statement Submitted by Palestine, ¶ 534 (Jan. 29, 2004), www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/131/
1555.pdf.
147  OKIMOTO, supra note 89, at 34. 
148 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 95 (finding that the Fourth Geneva Convention, which applies 
to armed conflicts, applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory). 
149 Id.; see Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84. 
150  Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84. 
151  Gross, supra note 138, at 574. 
152 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 141. 
153  Scobbie, supra note 144, at 84. 
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Instead of Article 51, Israel can potentially rely on the doctrine of 
necessity,154 discussed in the next section, which is recognized by 
international customary law.155 In fact, the ICJ considered the construction 
of the wall under the doctrine of necessity, but found the doctrine could not 
be availed because the chosen route of the wall—running deep into the 
West Bank, thereby significantly impairing Palestinians’ movement and 
resulting in the destruction of their property—was not the only means that 
Israel had to protect its interests.156 In any case, the right to take defensive 
measures is not legally equivalent to the right of self-defense under Article 
51.157 Just because Israel does not have a right under Article 51 does not 
mean it has no right to protect its civilians under other legal doctrines. 
Since the Court’s opinion in 2004, Palestine has gained non-member 
observer State status at the U.N. General Assembly, which could have 
consequences for the applicability of Article 51 self-defense. The ICJ 
interpreted Article 51 to apply only to armed attacks from one State against 
another.158 In 2004, when the ICJ issued its Wall advisory opinion, Palestine 
was arguably not a “State.” Its status at the U.N. General Assembly was 
only that of an “observer entity,” which was first accorded to it in 1974.159
In 2012, by a vote of 138 in favor and 9 against, the U.N. General 
Assembly voted to upgrade Palestine’s status to that of non-member 
observer State.160 Since its status upgrade, Palestine has signed onto at least 
fifteen international treaties, which are available only to States.161 Even 
before the status upgrade, however, Palestine was recognized as a State by 
130 governments and had joined the United Nations Educational, Scientific 
and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) as a member State.162 With its new 
status, Palestine was also able to accede to the Rome Statute, granting the 
International Criminal Court (ICC) jurisdiction to investigate crimes 
committed on Occupied Palestinian Territory.163 Before Palestine’s status 
154 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25. 
155 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 142–43. 
156 Id. ¶ 195. 
157  Scobbie, supra note 144, at 78. 
158 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139. 
159  Press Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Votes Overwhelmingly to Accord 
Palestine “Non-Member Observer State” Status in United Nations, U.N. Press Release GA/11317 (Nov. 
29, 2012).
160 Id.
161  Ken Klippenstein, An Interview with Richard Falk on the Crisis in Gaza, COUNTER PUNCH
(Aug. 13, 2014), www.counterpunch.org/2014/08/13/an-interview-with-richard-falk-on-the-crisis-in-
gaza; see Palestinians Sign Up to Join International Criminal Court, BBC NEWS (Dec. 31, 2014), 
www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-30645462 (writing that the PA signed on to twenty international 
treaties).
162  Klippenstein, supra note 161. 
163  Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, The Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court, 
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upgrade, the ICC refused to open an investigation because Palestine was not 
a “State” within the meaning of the Rome Statute and, therefore, the ICC 
lacked jurisdiction.164 After Palestine’s status upgrade, however, the ICC 
has opened a preliminary investigation into crimes committed on 
Palestinian territory.165 It also accepted Palestine as a member State party to 
the Rome Statute.166
With its status upgrade, Palestine is most likely a State for purposes of 
Article 51. If Article 51 self-defense applies, then it follows that as long as 
Israel’s use of force was in line with the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in jus ad bellum as well as the rules of warfare in jus in 
bello or IHL, then force was probably legitimate and not for the illegitimate 
purpose of suppressing self-determination. 
Despite Palestine’s status upgrade, however, Article 51 likely still does 
not apply because the terror attacks at issue are not attributable to the State 
of Palestine. They are terror attacks launched by Hamas and some Bedouin 
groups in the Gaza Strip while the recognized authority of the territory is 
the Palestinian Authority led by President Mahmoud Abbas. The attacks, 
therefore, do not constitute an armed attack by one State against another. 
The ICC also stated, in an Article 53(1) Report issued after Palestine’s 
status upgrade, that the Israel-Hamas conflict “do[es] not meet the basic 
definition of an international armed conflict as a conflict between two or 
more states.”167
Furthermore, the language of the ICJ Wall opinion suggests that the 
Court found Article 51 irrelevant not because the Court did not find 
Palestine to be a State but rather because “Israel does not claim that the 
attacks against it are imputable to a foreign State.”168 Regardless of 
Palestine’s objective legal status, it seems Israel cannot avail itself of the 
self-defense argument while simultaneously denying Palestine’s status as a 
State.
Fatou Bensouda, Opens a Preliminary Examination of the Situation in Palestine, I.C.C. Press Release 
ICC-OTP-20150116-PR1083 (Jan. 16, 2015).
164 Situation in Palestine, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, at 2 (Apr. 3, 2012), www.icc-cpi.int/
NR/rdonlyres/9B651B80-EC43-4945-BF5A-FAFF5F334B92/284387/SituationinPalestine030412ENG.
pdf.
165 ICC to Probe Possible War Crimes in Palestine, AL JAZEERA (Jan. 17, 2015, 11:30 AM), 
www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2015/01/icc-probe-possible-war-crimes-palestine-2015116151720
780168.html.
166 Palestinian Authority Becomes Official Member of the International Criminal Court,
HAARETZ (Apr. 1, 2015, 10:36 AM), www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/1.650013?utm_
source=Facebook&utm_campaign=Echobox&utm_medium=Social.
167 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, ¶ 16 (Nov. 6, 2014), www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/otp/OTP-COM-Article_
53%281%29-Report-06Nov2014Eng.pdf.
168 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139 (emphasis added). 
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
37792-fiu_11-1 Sheet No. 141 Side B      04/28/2016   10:11:02
C M
Y K
14 - RAIS_FINAL_4.15.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 4/15/16 8:21 PM
276 FIU Law Review [Vol. 11:255 
Since the ICJ’s Wall opinion in 2004, Israel has disengaged from the 
Gaza Strip, which could affect the applicability of Security Council 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373. The Court rejected the self-defense argument 
under Resolutions 1368 and 1373 because the West Bank is under Israeli 
control; so, in the case of Operation Protective Edge, the question is 
whether Gaza is still under the control of Israel. Gaza’s status as occupied 
territory since Israel’s disengagement169 has been the subject of much 
debate. If Gaza is still considered to be under Israeli control, then 
Resolutions 1368 and 1373 are inapplicable, but if it is not, then Israel may 
have a valid self-defense justification for Operation Protective Edge. Once 
again, if the self-defense argument applies, then it follows that force was 
probably legitimate as long as it met the principles of necessity and 
proportionality in jus ad bellum as well as the rules of war in jus in bello or 
IHL. 
Gaza’s legal status has been under dispute since Israel withdrew its 
military from Gaza and dismantled settlements in the strip in 2005.170 Yuval 
Shany conducts a comparative analysis of the degree of effective control 
exercised by Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and finds that the PA 
has greater powers of government than Israel.171 Therefore, he concludes 
that Israel can no longer be regarded as the occupying power in Gaza.172
Other scholars have argued under other theories and rationale for why Israel 
no longer occupies the Gaza strip. On the other hand, many in the 
international community, including the ICC, are of the opinion that Israel 
continues to occupy Gaza 
based on the scope and degree of control that Israel has retained over 
the territory of Gaza following the 2005 disengagement – including, 
inter alia, Israel’s exercise of control over border crossings, the 
territorial sea adjacent to the Gaza Strip, and the airspace of Gaza; its 
periodic military incursions within Gaza; its enforcement of no-go 
areas within Gaza near the border where Israeli settlements used to be; 
and its regulation of the local monetary market based on the Israeli 
169 See generally Israel’s Disengagement Plan: Renewing the Peace Process, ISRAEL MINISTRY
OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Apr. 20, 2005), www.mfa.gov.il/mfa/foreignpolicy/peace/guide/pages/israels%
20disengagement%20plan-%20renewing%20the%20peace%20process%20apr%202005.aspx. 
170 See id.
171  Yuval Shany, Faraway, So Close: The Legal Status of Gaza After Israel’s Disengagement, 8 
Y.B. OF INT’L HUMANITARIAN L. 369 (2006); see also Avinoam Sharom, Why Is Israel’s Presence in 
the Territories Still Called “Occupation”?, JERUSALEM CTR. FOR PUB. AFFAIRS (2009), http://jcpa.org/
text/Occupation-Sharon.pdf (concluding that occupation law does not apply to Gaza); Elizabeth Samson, 
Is Gaza Occupied? Redefining the Status of Gaza Under International Law, 25 AM. U. INT’L L. REV.
915 (2010). 
172  Shany, supra note 171. 
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currency and control of taxes and customs duties.173
It is beyond the scope of this Comment to fully analyze the debates on 
Gaza’s legal status, especially when the “overwhelming consensus”174 and 
“prevalent view within the international community is that Israel remains an 
occupying power under international law.”175 This Comment will proceed 
while assuming this prevalent view. 
Because Israel continues to occupy Gaza, “[t]he situation is . . . 
different from that contemplated by Security Council resolutions [1368 and 
1373].”176 The Resolutions refer to the inherent right of self-defense in the 
context of “international terrorism” but insofar as attacks emanate from 
territory which Israel controls, they do not constitute international terrorism. 
Thus, because Israel continues to control Gaza, attacks launched from Gaza 
do not constitute international terrorism. Therefore, just how Resolutions 
1368 and 1373 did not apply to terror attacks emanating from the West 
Bank, so they do not apply to attacks that are launched from Gaza. 
After extending the ICJ’s analysis in the Wall opinion to Gaza, it 
seems that Article 51 self-defense is not applicable to the Gaza Strip either. 
Even though Palestine has now gained State status, attacks launched by 
Hamas do not constitute an armed attack from a State since the international 
community does not recognize Hamas as the legitimate authority of 
Palestine. Even if the international community did, still Israel does not 
recognize Palestine to be a State while the language of the Court’s Wall
opinion suggests that such recognition is a prerequisite to invoking Article 
51 self-defense. Nor do Security Council Resolutions 1368 or 1373 seem to 
apply since they refer to international terrorism while terror attacks 
launched from Gaza emanate from within territory that Israel continues to 
control.
173 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
supra note 165, ¶ 27; see also Duggard, supra note 12; Lisa Hajjar, Is Gaza Still Occupied and Why 
Does It Matter?, JADALIYYA (July 14, 2014), www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/8807/is-gaza-still-
occupied-and-why-does-it-matter; Israel: Disengagement Will Not End Gaza Occupation, HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH (Oct. 29, 2004), www.hrw.org/news/2004/10/28/israel-disengagement-will-not-end-
gaza-occupation; The Gaza Strip: Israel’s Obligations Under International Law, B’TSELEM (Jan. 1, 
2015), www.btselem.org/gaza_strip/israels_obligations. 
174  Valentina Azarov, Disingenuous “Disengagement”: Israel’s Occupation of the Gaza Strip 
and the Protective Function of the Law of Belligerent Occupation, OPINIO JURIS (Apr. 24, 2012), http://
opiniojuris.org/2012/04/24/disingenuous-disengagement-israels-occupation-of-the-gaza-strip-and-the-pr
otective-function-of-the-law-of-belligerent-occupation (“[T]he vigorous academic debate concerning the 
current status of the Gaza Strip has arrived at an overwhelming consensus over the fact that the Gaza 
Strip remains occupied territory.”) 
175 Situation on Registered Vessels of Comoros, Greece and Cambodia Article 53(1) Report,
supra note 165, ¶ 16 (emphasis added). 
176 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 139. 
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SECTION IV: THE DOCTRINE OF NECESSITY
If not jus in bello, the law of occupation, or the law of self-defense, 
then perhaps the doctrine of necessity can help shed some light on the 
question of whether an occupying power used force to protect its civilians 
or to suppress self-determination. The doctrine of necessity is also known 
as “state of necessity,” “essential interests doctrine,” and the “plea of 
necessity.” 
The doctrine of necessity precludes the wrongfulness of a State’s act 
that is not in conformity with international obligations.177 A State may 
invoke the doctrine of necessity if the only way that a State can protect an 
“essential interest” against a “grave an imminent peril” is by not fulfilling 
an international obligation of relatively less significance.178 The doctrine of 
necessity is codified in the Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts, which was adopted by the International Law 
Commission in 2001. It is also recognized as customary international law179
as confirmed by the ICJ for the first time in its Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project decision.180 The doctrine can only be invoked under strict 
conditions defined in Article 25 of the Articles.181 Furthermore, it cannot be 
invoked if “the international obligation in question excludes the possibility 
of invoking necessity” or “the State has contributed to the situation of 
necessity.”182
While the plea of necessity was historically only related to the concept 
of self-preservation and other essential State interests, today it also 
encompasses human security interests.183 Necessity has been invoked to 
safeguard essential interests such as protecting the environment184 and 
ensuring the safety of civilians.185
An early successful case of necessity was the Caroline incident, which 
is usually wrongly referred to as a case of self-defense.186 In that case in 
1837, British forces destroyed a United States vessel carrying recruits and 
arms to Canadian insurgents who wanted to rebel against the British Crown. 
177 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25. 
178 Id.
179 Contra Sarah Heathcote, Is State of Necessity a Principle of Customary International Law? 1 
REVUE BELGE DE DROIT INT’L 53 (2007) (writing that State practice does not support the assertion, 
prevalent in judicial decisions, that the doctrine of necessity is customary international law). 
180  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project (Hung./Slovk.), 1977 I.C.J. 7 (Sept. 25). 
181 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, at art. 25. 
182 Id. at art. 25(2)(a)–(b). 
183  Ian Johnston, The Plea of “Necessity” in International Legal Discourse: Humanitarian 
Intervention and Counter-Terrorism, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 337, 340 (2004–05). 
184  Gabcikovo-Nagymaros Project, supra note 180. 
185 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 140–43. 
186 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25 cmt. (5). 
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The British justified the destruction of the vessel by referring to the 
“necessity of self-defence and self-preservation.”187 United States Secretary 
of State Webster stated in his message to Congress, “This government can 
never concede to any foreign Government the power, except in a case of the 
most urgent and extreme necessity, of invading its territory.”188 The 
incident was finally settled in 1842 when the British and American 
governments agreed that “a strong overpowering necessity may arise when 
this great principle may and must be suspended.”189
In order to safeguard against abuse, the plea is only accepted on an 
exceptional basis.190 The ICJ in the Wall opinion, for example, considered 
whether Israel could rely on the doctrine of necessity for its construction of 
the wall in the West Bank.191 The essential interest that Israel was 
safeguarding was the safety of its civilians. However, the ICJ found that the 
facts of the case did not meet the strict conditions under which necessity 
can be invoked.192 One of those conditions is that the wrongful act be “the 
only way for the State to safeguard an essential interest.”193 The particular 
route of the wall, the ICJ found, was not the only means at Israel’s disposal 
to safeguard its interest. Israel could have, for example, built the wall on its 
side of the Green Line instead of miles into the West Bank. 
It is important to note that the ICJ did not address the fact that Israel 
could never successfully invoke the plea of necessity in the Wall case since 
its construction violated the preemptory norm of self-determination.194
Article 26 of the Articles excludes the possibility of invoking the plea of 
necessity if the wrongful act “is not in conformity with an obligation arising 
under a preemptory norm of general international law.”195 The 
commentaries to the Articles explicitly list respecting the right to self-
determination as an example of a preemptory norm from which no 
derogation is possible even under the doctrine of necessity.196 The ICJ 
found that the wall “severely impedes the exercise by the Palestinian people 
of its right to self-determination and is therefore a breach of Israel’s 
187  LORD MCNAIR, 2 INTERNATIONAL LAW OPINIONS 228 (1956). 
188 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS, 1841–1842 vol. 30 at 194 (1857), http://hdl.handle.net/
2027/mdp.35112103940203.
189 Id. at 196. 
190 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25 cmt.(2). 
191 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶¶ 140–43. 
192 Id. at 142. 
193 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 25. 
194  Sarah Heathcote, Circumstances Precluding Wrongfulness: Necessity, in THE LAW OF INT’L
RESPONSIBILITY 491, 500 (James Crawford et al. eds., 2010). 
195 Draft Articles on Responsibility of States, supra note 19, art. 26. 
196 Id. at art. 26 cmt. (5). 
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obligation to respect that right.”197 Given that the Court had already 
concluded that the wall violated the right to self-determination—a 
preemptory norm—it was unnecessary for it to even conduct the plea of 
necessity analysis. The plea is unavailable if the wrongful act violates a 
preemptory norm. 
Nevertheless, even though the plea of necessity was unsuccessful in 
the particular instance of the wall in the West Bank, the Wall opinion 
shows that Israel can in principle rely on necessity to use force against 
terror attacks emanating from the Occupied Palestinian Territory. That is as 
long as it does not violate the obligation to respect the Palestinians’ right to 
self-determination in the process. In effect this means that the doctrine of 
necessity does not help answer the question whether force was used to 
protect civilians or to suppress self-determination. This is because necessity 
precluding the wrongfulness of an act presumes a wrong act, which brings 
us back to the question whether force was in fact wrong (i.e., for the 
purpose of suppressing self-determination). 
In the Wall opinion, for example, the construction of the wall was 
wrong because it violated several provisions of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention and the Hague Regulations, including the destruction of private 
property of the occupied inhabitants, as well as several provisions of the 
International Covenant on the Civil and Political Rights.198 The doctrine of 
necessity was considered by the ICJ only after the wrongfulness of the wall 
was established.199 But how is one to know whether force in Operation 
Protective Edge was wrongfully used to suppress the Gazans’ struggle for 
self-determination? This is the very question that this Comment seeks to 
answer. Even determining whether the plea of necessity is excluded under 
Article 26 requires a preliminary determination of whether force violated 
the preemptory norm of the right to self-determination. Applying the 
doctrine of necessity itself necessitates answering the question at issue in 
this Comment. It, therefore, does not help to determine whether force by an 
occupying power was used to protect civilians or to suppress self-
determination. 
SECTION V: INTRODUCTION TO THE TWO-FACTOR TEST
Neither jus in bello, occupation law, the law of self-defense, nor the 
doctrine of necessity offer appropriate guidance to determine whether force 
used by an occupying power was to protect its civilians or to suppress a 
people’s right to self-determination. Jus in bello is inapplicable to the 
197 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 122. 
198 Id.  ¶¶ 132–34. 
199 Id. ¶ 140. 
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question at hand since it merely governs how armed hostilities are 
conducted once they have begun, and is unconcerned with the motives 
behind the use of force. Furthermore, occupation law in general is inapt to 
deal with the question since it developed outside the context of colonial 
occupation and, therefore, does not account for self-determination. The law 
of self-defense, Article 51 of the U.N. Charter specifically, is inapplicable 
against attacks launched by Hamas since it is not a State actor and Article 
51 is traditionally interpreted as applying only to force used by one State 
against another. Nor is the new conceptualization of self-defense under 
U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which extends to 
international terrorism from non-State actors, relevant because the 
Occupied Palestinian Territory (including Gaza) is within the control of 
Israel. Attacks emanating from within the Occupied Palestinian Territory, 
therefore, do not constitute “international terrorism” under the 
Resolutions.200 As for the doctrine of necessity, it presumes a wrong act, 
which brings us back to the question of whether force was indeed wrong 
(i.e., was it used to suppress self-determination?). None of these legal 
regimes or doctrines directly or even indirectly answers the question at 
issue in this Comment. Neither forms an appropriate legal basis for 
determining the issue at hand. 
It follows, therefore, that tackling the question would require a factual 
determination on a case-by-case basis. The ICJ in the Wall case, for 
example, found that the wall in the West Bank violated the Palestinians’ 
right to self-determination because it created a “fait acompli,” which would 
eventually become permanent and be “tantamount to de facto 
annexation.”201 It determined so after carefully considering all facts and 
arguments both defending the wall (including the argument that the wall is 
a temporary structure to be dismantled upon a final resolution to the 
conflict) and opposing it.202 The Court did not refer to any law or legal test 
as the basis for its determination, which we now know is because such a 
legal basis does not exist. A similar factual determination is required to 
determine whether force used in Operation Protective Edge was for the 
legitimate purpose of protecting civilians or for suppressing the struggle for 
self-determination. 
This Comment proposes a two-factor test to help with the factual 
determination. The test involves the following two factors: (1) was force 
necessary to combat the threat to Israel’s inhabitants; and (2) did force go 
beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat? “Necessary” under 
200  SC Resolution 1368, supra note 135; SC Resolution 1373, supra note 136. 
201 Wall opinion, supra note 17, ¶ 121. 
202 Id. ¶ 116. 
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the first factor means that no viable non-forceful alternatives were 
available. If force was not necessary to protect inhabitants because other 
means of protection were available and feasible, then this is an indication 
that force was for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing self-
determination. The condition that alternative means be feasible anticipates 
situations when other means may be available but not feasible for reasons 
such as temporal constraints. A threat may be imminent while non-forceful 
means may take time to implement. 
When it comes to the second factor, if an occupying power is indeed 
protecting its inhabitants, it would use only so much force as is necessary to 
combat the threat and no more. The concept is similar to Daniel Webster’s 
statement during the Caroline affair, “the act justified by the necessity . . . 
must be limited by that necessity and kept clearly within it.”203 If force goes 
beyond that which was necessary to protect inhabitants, then the excess is 
likely for the illegitimate purpose of suppressing self-determination. 
The two-factor test should not be confused with either the doctrine of 
necessity precluding the wrongfulness of an act or jus ad bellum necessity. 
While the two-factor test is similar to some of the conditions of the doctrine 
of necessity, the legal status and the purpose of the two are completely 
different. While the doctrine of necessity is customary international law that 
precludes the wrongfulness of an act, the two-factor test is simply a non-
exhaustive list of factors that a fact-finder may employ to determine the 
purpose of the use of force by an occupying power. Sequentially, the two-
factor test comes earlier in the analysis than the doctrine of necessity. 
Nor should the two-factor test be confused with jus ad bellum
necessity. While the two seem extremely similar in their content, they are 
wholly different in their legal status and purpose. The factors are just that—
factors. They simply help make a factual determination regarding the 
purpose behind the use of force by an occupying power. Unlike jus ad 
bellum necessity, the factors do not form a legal basis for the use of force. 
This Comment has already established that Israel cannot rely on any legal 
basis, except the doctrine of necessity, to use force against attacks launched 
by Hamas in Gaza. The factors simply help determine whether the force 
used by Israel was indeed for the purpose of protecting its inhabitants or 
whether its aim was to suppress the Gazans’ right to self-determination. 
The second factor should not be confused with jus in bello
proportionality as the two seem very similar. Jus in bello proportionality is 
concerned with whether the harm to civilian life and property was 
203  Nicholas Tsagourias, Necessity and the Use of Force: A Special Regime, 41 NETHERLANDS
Y.B. OF INT’L L. 11, 15 (2011). 
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proportional to the direct and concrete military advantage sought.204 Jus in 
bello proportionality, in other words, tries to weigh the cost to civilian life 
and property against the military gain achieved. The second of the two 
factors proposed in this Comment, however, does not consider the harm to 
civilian life or property at all. Nor does it involve a weighing of the harm 
against the military advantage gained. Rather, the second factor is only 
concerned with whether the force used, regardless of whether or not it was 
proportional to the military advantage sought, went beyond that which was 
necessary to combat the threat at hand. The harm from the use of force 
could be wholly disproportional to the military advantage sought and yet be 
within the limits of that which is necessary to combat the threat at hand. 
The two factors are simply considerations that a fact-finder should take 
into account when making a factual determination on the purpose behind 
the use of force by an occupying power. They help ground the analysis and 
provide some level of uniformity in analyses from case to case. The factors 
neither are conclusive in and of themselves nor do they constitute an 
exhaustive list of factors to consider when making a factual determination. 
Rather, they should be used alongside other relevant considerations, if any, 
and should be viewed within the larger context of the occupation at issue. 
SECTION VI: APPLYING THE TWO-FACTOR TEST TO 
OPERATION PROTECTIVE EDGE—GAZA’S TUNNELS
One of the officially stated purposes of Operation Protective Edge was 
to destroy the “terror tunnels.”205 These tunnels, built by Hamas, reach up to 
thirty meters below the ground.206 They run across the border from Gaza 
into Israeli territory. According to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu, the 
Israeli army, and other Israeli officials, the “sole purpose” of the tunnels 
was to kill Israeli civilians,207 although it is more likely that the target of the 
tunnels were Israeli soldiers.208 It was through a tunnel that Hamas had 
204  Adil Ahmad Haque, A Theory of Jus in Bello Proportionality, in WEIGHING LIVES:
COMBATANTS & CIVILIANS IN WAR (Jens Ohlin et al. eds., forthcoming 2016), www.academia.edu/
11341774/A_Theory_of_Jus_in_Bello_Proportionality.
205 The IDF’s Mission in Gaza: Destroy Hamas Terror Tunnels, IDF BLOG (July 17, 2014), 
www.idfblog.com/blog/2014/07/17/idf-begins-ground-operation-gaza.
206 Inside the Tunnels Hamas Built: Israel’s Struggle Against New Tactic in Gaza War, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 2, 2014, 10:16 AM), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/02/tunnels-hamas-israel-
struggle-gaza-war.
207 Aaron Klein & Mitch Ginsburg, Could Israeli Soldiers, Not Civilians, Be the Target of the 
Attack Tunnels?, TIMES OF ISRAEL (July 29, 2014, 1:03 PM), www.timesofisrael.com/soldiers-not-
civilians-are-tunnel-infiltration-goals-says-senior-intelligence-source; Emanual Yalin, Were Gaza 
Tunnels Built to Harm Israeli Civilians?, 972 MAG (Aug. 11, 2014), http://972mag.com/were-gaza-
tunnels-built-to-harm-israeli-civilians/95279.
208  Klein & Ginsburg, supra note 207; Yalin, supra note 207 (citing leader of Hamas’ Qassam 
Brigade’s interest in targeting Israeli soldiers over civilians). 
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kidnapped Israeli soldier, Gilad Shalit, in 2006, who was later released in 
2011 in a prisoner swap deal.209 All tunnels leading into Israel opened 
within a few hundred meters of the Israel-Gaza border, and none opened 
into civilian communities.210
While Israel had known about the existence of the tunnels “for some 
time,” it was not aware of just how vast and effective the tunnel system 
was.211 This discovery was made after Israel had already launched 
Operation Protective Edge. Upon discovery of the tunnels, according to 
some Israeli officials, the objective of the operation shifted from stopping 
Hamas rocket fire to destroying the tunnels.212 According to the Israeli 
military, there were forty such tunnels of which fourteen connected to 
Israel.213
Applying the first factor of the two-factor test, it is clear that the use of 
force was not necessary to combat the threat posed by the tunnels because 
of the availability of viable non-forceful alternatives. While there were 
fourteen tunnels that connected to Israel, there were around 1,400 that lead 
to Egypt.214 The tunnels to Egypt were used to smuggle in goods after Israel 
imposed a siege on Gaza, which crippled its economy and led to the 
development of an active underground trade.215 The tunnel trade with Egypt 
was essential for Gaza’s economy following the imposition of the siege in 
2007. In one incident, militants also used the tunnels to cross into Egypt 
where they gunned down sixteen Egyptian border guards.216 General Sisi of 
Egypt neutralized the threat of the tunnels by simply sealing them off at the 
Egyptian side of the border.217 In some cases, Egypt flooded the tunnels.218
209 Timeline 1,940 Days from Gilad Shalit’s Abduction to His Release, supra note 6.
210 Id.; Klein & Ginsburg, supra note 207. Reports on tunnels leading to Israeli kindergartens 
and other civilian areas were later discovered to be false. James North & Phil Weiss, Tunnels-to-
Kindergartens Propaganda Netanyahu Peddled to NYT and CNN Is Exploded by Israeli News Site,
MONDOWEISS (Aug. 13, 2014), http://mondoweiss.net/2014/08/kindergartens-propaganda-netanyahu. 
211 Inside the Tunnels Hamas Built: Israel’s Struggle Against New Tactic in Gaza War, supra
note 206. 
212  Asa Fitch et al., Early Failure to Detect Gaza Tunnel Network Triggers Recriminations in 
Israel, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 10, 2014), www.wsj.com/articles/gaza-tunnel-network-fuels-recriminations-
in-israel-1407714903.
213  Alejandra Azuero-Quijano, Gaza’s Tunnel Paradox, AL JAZEERA AMERICA (Aug. 14, 2014, 
6:00 AM), http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/8/gaza-tunnel-siegeisraelidfblockade.html.
214 Egyptian Military Says It Destroyed 1,370 Gaza Smuggling Tunnels, THE NATIONAL (Mar. 
12, 2014, 8:49 PM), www.thenational.ae/world/palestinian-territories/egyptian-military-says-it-
destroyed-1-370-gaza-smuggling-tunnels.
215 Is the Closure of the Tunnels from Egypt Further Suffocating the Gaza Economy?, UNISPAL 
(Feb., 2014), https://unispal.un.org/pdfs/WFP_SpFocus-GazaTunnels.pdf. 
216 Egypt Moves to Seal off Gaza Smuggling Tunnels, JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 7, 2012, 5:15 
PM), www.jpost.com/Middle-East/Egypt-moves-to-seal-off-Gaza-smuggling-tunnels. 
217 Id.; Gaza Ceasefire: After 1,800+ Dead, What Led Israel to Stop the Assault—And What 
Comes Next? DEMOCRACY NOW! (Aug. 5, 2014), www.democracynow.org/2014/8/5/ceasefire_after_
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Egypt did not have to go into Gaza and use devastating force in order to 
deal with the tunnel threat. 
In fact, non-forceful measures were available to Israel for years before 
Operation Protective Edge. The Israeli Defense Ministry was considering 
digging a moat around Gaza to stop the tunnels as far back as the year 
2000.219 It had spent several years and a significant amount of money on the 
idea.220 It was not as if using force was the better or more effective option. 
In fact, because the tunnels were deep below the ground, they were not 
vulnerable to bombs or artillery shells.221
Applying the second factor of the two-factor test, the force used by 
Israel went beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat posed by 
the tunnels, indicating a motive other than the neutralization of a threat to 
its inhabitants. For example, Israel struck United Nations Relief Works 
Agency (UNRWA) schools sheltering displaced Palestinians multiple times 
despite the fact that the UNRWA had informed the Israeli military of the 
schools’ coordinates multiple times.222 Striking the schools, which resulted 
in the deaths of forty-seven civilians,223 was completely unnecessary to 
combat the threat posed by the tunnels. It was also unnecessary to stop 
rocket attacks, the second stated purpose of Operation Protective Edge, 
since the schools were not housing Hamas members or rockets. While the 
UNRWA found Hamas rockets stored in some of the agency’s schools, 
these were not the schools that Israel targeted.224 Following Operation 
Protective Edge, Amnesty International published a report, which revealed 
“a pattern of frequent Israeli attacks using large aerial bombs to level 
civilian homes, sometimes killing entire families.”225 Amnesty International 
found that some of the attacks served no military purpose.226 The lack of 
military purpose for the strikes on homes goes beyond that which was 
gaza_assault_leaves_1800.
218  Abeer Ayyoub, Egypt Floods Gaza’s Smuggling Tunnels, AL MONITOR (Feb. 21, 2013), 
www.al-monitor.com/pulse/en/contents/articles/originals/2013/02/egypt-floods-gaza-tunnels.html#. 
219 Early Failure to Detect Gaza Tunnel Network Triggers Recriminations in Israel, supra note 
212.
220 Id.
221 Gaza Ceasefire: After 1,800+ Dead, What Led Israel to Stop the Assault—And What Comes 
Next?, supra note 217.
222  Raya Jalabi et al., Gaza Crisis: A Closer Look at Israeli Strikes on UNRWA Schools, THE
GUARDIAN (Aug. 8, 2014, 2:31 PM), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/aug/08/-sp-gaza-israeli-strikes-
unrwa-schools.
223 Id.
224 See Israel/Gaza: Attack on U.N. School in Gaza a Potential War Crime That Must Be 
Investigated, AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL (July 30, 2014), www.amnesty.org/en/news/israelgaza-attack-
un-school-gaza-potential-war-crime-must-be-investigated-2014-07-30.
225 Id.
226 Id.
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necessary to combat the threat of the tunnels (or even the threat posed by 
Hamas rockets). This indicates a motive other than the protection of Israeli 
lives.
Furthermore, at least 120 Palestinians were killed during the Shujaiyah 
assault.227 Israeli soldiers allegedly drew an imaginary, arbitrary red line 
and shot anyone who crossed it, whether civilian or combatant.228 Four of 
Mohammed Fathi Al Areer’s brothers, including his mentally disabled 
sibling, were shot in cold blood.229 Israeli soldiers also shot dead four 
unarmed members of the Shamaly family after breaking into their home.230
A fifth member of the Shamaly family was shot while he was searching 
among the rubble for his family members during a temporary ceasefire.231
The indiscriminate force used in Shujaiyah went well beyond that which 
was necessary to combat the threat of either the tunnels or Hamas rockets. 
The intentional targeting of civilians without military purpose achieves 
nothing towards the end of destroying the tunnels or killing Hamas 
members in order to protect Israeli inhabitants. The excessive use of force 
without military purpose indicates a motive other than the protection of 
Israeli lives. 
Therefore, the use of force was not necessary to combat the threat 
posed by the tunnels as Israel could have simply sealed them off or flooded 
them like Egypt did. Additionally, in several instances, the force Israel used 
went far beyond that which was necessary to destroy the tunnels (or even to 
stop the rocket attacks), indicating that the motive behind the use of force 
was something other than the protection of Israeli lives. 
Other considerations that support this finding are certain statements 
made by Israeli officials and certain official Israeli policies. Israeli officials 
have themselves stated their intentions to suppress the Gazans’ struggle for 
self-determination or destroy their national liberation movement. It is 
openly admitted by Israeli officials, including those in the Defense 
Ministry, that the aim of Israel’s policy towards Gaza is to make life so 
miserable for Gazans that it forces them to turn against the government of 
Hamas.232 Following Operation Cast Lead in 2008-2009, Israeli Prime 
227  Peter Beaumont, Gaza Crisis: Palestinian Death Toll Climbs Past 500 as Hospital Is Hit,
THE GUARDIAN (July 21, 2014), www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/21/gaza-crisis-obama-ceasefire-
fighting-goes-on.
228 The Untold Story of the Shejaiya Massacre in Gaza: A Former Israel Soldier Speaks Out,
DEMOCRACY NOW! (Sept. 12, 2014), www.democracynow.org/2014/9/12/the_untold_story_of_the_
shejaiya.
229 Id.
230 Id.
231 Id.
232  Nicholas Kristof, Winds of War in Gaza, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 7, 2015), www.nytimes.com/
2015/03/08/opinion/sunday/nicholas-kristof-winds-of-war-in-gaza.html?_r=1; see Yossi Wolfson, 
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Minister Netanyahu stated that the operation should have lasted longer so 
the IDF could have toppled Hamas.233 Toppling or weakening the resistance 
capacity of an elected government (and also a liberation group) is probably 
the clearest violation of the obligation to respect the right to self-
determination. Most recently, Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu said in an 
interview in March of 2015 that as long as he is in power, he will not allow 
the creation of a Palestinian State.234 Meanwhile, in 2001, a camera caught 
Netanyahu describing how he manipulated the peace process in a way that 
would have left the Oslo Accords null and void.235
When considering the above in light of the fact that the occupation has 
been running for forty-eight years, it becomes even more likely that the aim 
of Operation Protective Edge was not simply to protect Israelis, but rather 
to stop Palestinian resistance all together. The head of the IDF’s Planning 
Division stated that the aim of Operation Protective Edge was to return to 
the status quo, which he described as a “calm in the south.”236 But to return 
to a “calm” effectively means to return to a situation of no resistance while 
the siege and control of Gaza’s borders, waters, and airspace continues. 
Insofar as the aim was for the Palestinians to give up any and all resistance 
and acquiesce to their condition, it is a violation of the obligation to respect 
their right to self-determination. Echoing John Duggard’s conclusion, the 
purpose of Israel’s use of force, in light of the two-factor test and 
surrounding circumstances, seems to be defending its occupation rather 
than defending its people. 
SECTION VII: CONCLUSION
As the law currently stands, no legal basis exists to ground an answer 
to the question of whether force used by an occupying power was for the 
purpose of protecting its inhabitants or for suppressing a people’s struggle 
for self-determination. Although the ICJ concluded in the Wall opinion that 
IHL applies to the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the jus in bello legal 
Economic Warfare in Gaza, THE ELECTRONIC INTIFADA (Jan. 21, 2008), http://electronicintifada.net/
content/economic-warfare-gaza/7308; Gaza on Brink of Implosion as Aid Cut-off Starts to Bite, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 15, 2006), www.theguardian.com/world/2006/apr/16/israel; Israel Used “Calorie 
Count” to Limit Gaza Food During Blockade, Critics Claim, THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 17, 2012), 
www.theguardian.com/world/2012/oct/17/israeli-military-calorie-limit-gaza.
233  Herb Keinon, Netanyhu: Toppling Hamas Remains an Option, JERUSALEM POST (Aug. 30, 
2014), www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Politics-And-Diplomacy/Netanyahu-Toppling-Hamas-remains-an-
option-372828.
234  Elliot McLaughlin, Israel’s PM Netanyahu: No Palestinian State on My Watch, CNN (Mar. 
16, 2015), www.cnn.com/2015/03/16/middleeast/israel-netanyahu-palestinian-state.
235 Netanyahu in 2001: America Is a Thing You Can Move Very Easily, HUFFINGTON POST (May 
25, 2011), www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/07/16/netanyahu-in-2001-america_n_649427.html?.
236  Yoav Zitun, Ya’alon Reiterates: Israel Chose Not to Topple Hamas During Gaza Op, YNET
NEWS (Sept. 30, 2014), www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4576235,00.html. 
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regime is irrelevant to the question posed in this Comment. Jus in bello
only deals with how warfare is conducted once an armed struggle begins 
and is not concerned with the motives behind the use of force. Nor is the 
law of occupation, in general, relevant to this question because the law of 
occupation was developed outside the context of colonial occupations and, 
thus, does not take into account issues of self-determination. The law of 
self-defense is an inappropriate legal basis to ground an analysis since 
Article 51 of the U.N. Charter self-defense traditionally only applies to an 
armed attack by one State against another. Israel does not recognize 
Palestine as a State, and even if it did, the attacks were launched by Hamas, 
which is a non-State actor. Nor does the new conceptualization of self-
defense under U.N. Security Council Resolutions 1368 and 1373, which 
encompasses armed attacks by non-State actors, apply since the relevant 
attacks emanate from territory within the control of Israel. Therefore, they 
do not constitute the type of “international terrorism” to which the 
Resolutions refer. Lastly, while the doctrine of necessity can apply to 
Israel’s use of force, it does not form an appropriate legal basis to ground 
analysis of the issue at play in this Comment either. The doctrine of 
necessity presumes a wrong act, which brings us back to the question of 
whether force used by an occupying power was indeed wrong (i.e., whether 
it was used to suppress the right to self-determination). 
Absent an appropriate legal basis, answering the question requires a 
case-by-case factual determination. The purpose of the two-factor test, 
proposed in this Comment, is to assist with that factual determination and 
provide some level of uniformity in analyses from case to case. Application 
of the two-factor test to the issue of tunnels leading from Gaza to Israel 
shows that Israel likely used force during Operation Protective Edge to 
suppress Palestinian resistance rather than to protect its inhabitants. Using 
bombs and artillery shells to destroy the tunnels, resulting in a large number 
of casualties, was not the only viable means with which Israel could combat 
the threat of the tunnels. Israel could have simply sealed the tunnels at its 
end or flooded them like Egypt did. Additionally, the force used was 
excessive and went beyond that which was necessary to combat the threat 
of tunnels (or even the threat posed by Hamas rockets). Both these factors 
are indicators of an intent to suppress Palestinian resistance rather than 
protect Israeli inhabitants. When considered within the larger context, 
including how long the occupation has lasted, statements made by Israeli 
officials, the crippling siege of Gaza, and certain official Israeli policies, it 
becomes even more likely that force was part of a larger policy to suppress 
Palestinian self-determination. Operation Protective Edge, it appears, was 
about defending the occupation rather than defending Israelis. 
